Showing posts with label cyber insurance policies. Show all posts
Showing posts with label cyber insurance policies. Show all posts

Tuesday, June 24, 2014

Part II. Some Substantive Contents of Cyber Policies

Some Substantive Contents of Cyber Policies

Michael Sean Quinn, Ph.D, J.D., Etc.
2630 Exposition Blvd  #115
Austin, Texas 78703
(o) 512-296-2594
(c) 512-656-0503

Some General Propositions.
There are very few industry-wide standardized cyber policies of any cyber species, but there are single-company uniformities in some policies.  This lack of the generalized use of standardized policies is true even though insurers read specimens of each others’ policies, and have joint insurer committees discussing standardization, among many other topics. 
Insurance companies have been forever conservative about moving into new topical areas. It took hundreds of years to move from coverage for protecting merchants from bandits while crossing the desert to creating primitive maritime insurance.  (The maritime portion of this type of insurance was called “bottomry.”)  Widely used maritime insurance, as we know it, took more than a 1000+ years to develop, then came commercial fire insurance a mere 250-300 years later.  In there somewhere was burial insurance for soldiers, which more or less died out; guild insurance on various perils, some of which pretty much lived into the 20th century, if labor unions are the progeny of guilds, and there are other components of this grand commercial evolution.
General organizational features of cyber policies have already been set forth.  In the cyber-world, some insuring agreements, some definitions, and some exclusions are quite unique. Nevertheless, cyber liability policies have thematic similarities. First, a generalized list for substantive components of first party policies will be discussed presently.  After that, such a list will be presented for liability policies. Some policies are liability policies only, others are first-party policies only.  Some policies may contain all the covered categories on the lists, a few of them have less than that, and some policies may have only one.  
Most cyber policies are package policies.  This means that there is more than one form of coverage, and the insured can pick parts of them.  This is not just a distinction between first-party coverage and third-party coverage.  There may be, say 10 different liability coverages, and a customer—and insured-to be—can often pick any one or more of them. (Sometimes the customer cannot pick just one and not at least one or more.  Imagine this: if a “near to being an insured” pick Insuring Agreement #2 it must pick Insuring Agreement #6, as well.
Of course, (a) pure excess policies, though not umbrella policies, and (b) reinsurance policies, whether the first level of reinsurance, the  “merely re,” or the next level up, the “retro re,” must work the same way, though for different reasons.  For excess policies, the insured under the primary policy is the insured under the excess and the umbrella. Thus, one would expect that excess policies would match up with primary policies, and that umbrella policies would also, to the extent they are not really primary policies.  And one would expect that that a reinsurance policy would match up with the policy being reinsured—at least for the most part. Neither of these expectations need be perfectly descriptive; the unexpected “non-match-up” can happen and be planed, agreed to, and rational.
Some Structural Categories for First-Party Policies
These sorts of policies are designed to help the insured to deal financially with covered events that unfortunately happen to it and cause losses.  The nature of the potentially unfortunate event is throughout insurance called “the risk,” and—throughout insurance—it is also called “the peril.” 
I find this common usage confusing. Guess what.  The cause of my confusion is the imperfect—indeed, inconsistent—pattern of usage.  Someone might think the way it should be done is this: a peril is a category of event, e.g., storms, for which there is coverage, while the risk is a concrete event of the sort which is a peril, i.e., the storm that occurred, where that event fits within the insuring agreement, but still may fit into exclusion.   The trouble is that this suggestion does not correspond to common though confused usage, and it does not set aside a term for the relationships between the potentially injury causing event, the risk, and the probability that the insured will sustain damages, i.e., its risk. And, of course, yet another distinction would have to be drawn.  On the one hand, the insured has risks arising from simply what it does and where it is done.  If an insured operates a fishing boat in the Gulf, it (i) faces the risk of storm; (ii)  if there is a storm, and the insured is in it, the insured faces the risk of destruction;  (iii) and if the storm destroys the boat, the insured faces the risk of going out of business.  There are three related but different risks here: (i) event risk, (ii) cause of damage risk, (iii) risk of loss. (Oh well. Conceptual life goes on. Besides,  there may be ways to integrate the vocabularies to avoid the semantic tangles. Thus instead of there being peril; there might be categories of risks.
In any case, here are categories of  risks that can be covered, unfortunate events that can be caused by these perils:
v  nature (actually a meta-category, or a peril-set, but never mind,
v   foul ups of the policyholder (including both negligence and some deliberate acts[i] of the insured),
v  those of another insured on the policy,
v   the policyholder’s employees 
v   one or more known or unknown outsiders,
v  either by their foul up(s) conjoined policyholder’s,
v  the deliberate acts of the strangers and perhaps others, as well. 
Of course, more or many more of these perils can participate in the same process and/or at the same time in creating the same risks or causing the same losses. In other words, causes of loss in the cyber world are just as combinatorial and therefore as many as in the real world.
 Both insurers and insureds want to know the probability of any risk, though for somewhat different reasons. And then they want to know the probability that a risk, having occurred, will cause loss.
Here are some typical insurance agreements in first-party cyber policies (or parts of policies):
§  The network security of the insured is breached.
§  The privacy components of the insured are breached.
§  A regulatory proceeding is inflicted upon the insured.
§  The insurer in subject to an adverse media event, e.g., an insured is defamed.
§  The insured’s digital asserts are destroyed, damaged, or rendered unusable.
§  The business income of the insured is reduced..
§  The insured is subject to an extortion or X-napping.
§  The insureds’ system is subject to negligent care of some sort:
o   Design
o   Construction
o   Maintenance
o   Securitization,    
o   and so forth
The reader will note that many of the covered categories, though not all, turn up on both the first-party cyber policies and the third-party policies,
            Of course, there is a whole variety of definitions.  Some commonly used terms are defined: “Damages,” for example; “Claims” for another.  Many of these terms and phrases are found in real world policies, though the definitions are most often different. Almost every term which is technical sounding and/or connected to something central in the cyber world is defined. The definitions are “stacked,” meaning that for many definitions that explicitly appear on the semantic surface of a policy, in the insuring agreement, for example—there is at least one definition used in it.  And then for many of the second level definition, there is a third, and so on.  Here are common examples of such terms: “Digital Assets” is like this, as is “Electronic Publishing” along with “Network Security,” and many others.
Some Corresponding Categories for Liability Policies
Here are some coverage categories for cyber liability policies. The insured’s liability rests upon performing “wrongful acts or omissions” (WAO [this abbreviation covering both the singular and the plural, as called for]) This whole category rests upon the definition of “wrongful act” and all of them are first-stage-triggers:
Ø  WAO injuring the network of another by dispatching “malicious codes,” and similar “poisons.”
Ø  WAO causing invasion(s) of privacy.
Ø  WAO causing release of private information by another by taking, turning over, distributing, or setting up others to do so.
Ø  WAO involving Internet media use.
Ø  WAO of cyber professionals and/or vendors of cyber-services,
Ø  Performance of any form of hacking, all of which are WAO’s, and/or
Ø  Assisting another (or others) who actually do the hacking.
In any given policy, the definitions section and the exclusionary section are the same for both first-party coverage and third-party coverage.  This is not unusual in package policies
A Few Elaborations.
There is more public concern and outrage regarding privacy invasions and thefts than any of the others. There is also more interest in these areas where liability insurance might be involved.  Many of the urging one finds in the advertising literature emphasize this topic.  It seems to me that sometimes the ads collapse together first-party concerns with privacy violations with third-party concerns. The idea that individuals might wish to buy special first-party insurance covering invasions of their own privacy coming from the cyber world is unheard of, as yet, so as I know.
Nevertheless, cyber-invasions of people and companies—actual inhabitants of the real, real-world are often categorized as “identity thefts,” and for good reason. Maybe a special first-party type coverage would be a good idea.  Think of the marvelous subrogation cases it would generate. 
Claims-Made Policies
Cyber policies are all “claims-made” policies, so far as I know. In general, this alone distinguishes the cyber policies from most other liability policies, which tend to be occurrence-based. In the latter, there can be covered injury that occurs during a policy period but which is not reported to or against the insurer by the alleged victim until after the policy period expires, sometimes a long time after; there may be coverage in such instances mostly dependent on the nature of the injury and other facts about what happened. (Think asbestos). This is not the way claims-made policies work. For them, the claim usually must occur during the policy period. 
In spite of the above distinction, there are many phases of claims under both claims-made policies in the so-called real-world and in the co-called cyber-world. All of them contain the following concepts:
           
*      Event (allegedly) causing injury (the risk?),
*      The type category of which that event is a type (the peril?)
*      The  injury or damage, sometimes called the “loss,”
*      The claim of alleged injury, and often a demand for compensation, made to the insured or its conduit, and against the insured (a communiqué of some sort, almost always written, but not always),
*      The notice by the insured to the insurer, often also called a “claim”—a claim or demand  for coverage (Many insurers try to insist, prima facie, anyway,  that the notice or claim come from the insured and it usually that it must be in writing, though not always.),
*      Adjustment, also often called a settlement process
*      Resolution or denial.
Some Substantive Contents of Cyber Policies
There are almost no industry-wide standardized cyber policies yet, but there are single-company uniformities in some policies.  This lack of the generalized use of standardized policies is true even though insurers read specimens of each others’ policies, and have joint insurer committees discussing standardization, among many other topics. 
Insurance companies have been forever conservative about moving into new topical areas. It took hundreds of years to move from coverage for protecting merchants from bandits while crossing the desert to creating primitive maritime insurance.  (The maritime portion of this type of insurance was called “bottomry.”)  Widely used maritime insurance, as we know it, took more than a 1000+ years to develop, then came commercial fire insurance a mere 250-300 years later.  In there somewhere was burial insurance for soldiers, which more or less died out; guild insurance on various perils, some of which pretty much lived into the 20th century, if labor unions are the progeny of guilds, and there are other components of this grand commercial evolution.
Some general organizational features of cyber policies have already been mentioned.  In the cyber-world, some insuring agreements, some definitions, and some exclusions are quite unique. Nevertheless, cyber liability policies have thematic similarities. First, a generalized list for substantive components of first party policies will be discussed presently.  After that, such a list will be presented for liability policies. Some policies are liability policies only, others are first-party policies only.  Some policies may contain all the covered categories on the lists, a few of them have less than that, and some policies may have only one.  
Most cyber policies are package policies.  This means that there is more than one form of coverage, and the insured can pick parts of them.  This is not just a distinction between first-party coverage and third-party coverage.  There may be, say 10 different liability coverages, and a customer—and insured-to be—can often pick any one or more of them. (Sometimes the customer cannot pick just one and not at least one or more.  Imagine this: if a “near to being an insured” pick Insuring Agreement #2 it must pick Insuring Agreement #6, as well.
Of course, (a) pure excess policies, though not umbrella policies, and (b) reinsurance policies, whether the first level of reinsurance, the  “merely re,” or the next level up, the “retro re,” must work the same way, though for different reasons.  For excess policies, the insured under the primary policy is the insured under the excess and the umbrella. Thus, one would expect that excess policies would match up with primary policies, and that umbrella policies would also, to the extent they are not really primary policies.  And one would expect that that a reinsurance policy would match up with the policy being reinsured—at least for the most part. Neither of these expectations need be perfectly descriptive; the unexpected “non-match-up” can happen and be planed, agreed to, and rational.
Structural Categories for First-Party Policies
These sorts of policies are designed to help the insured to deal financially with covered events that unfortunately happen to it and cause losses.  The nature of the unfortunate event is throughout insurance called “the risk.” These unfortunate events can be caused by
v  nature,
v   foul ups of the policyholder (including both negligence and some deliberate acts of the insured),
v  those of another insured on the policy,
v   the policyholder’s employees 
v   one or more known or unknown outsiders,
v  either by their foul up(s) conjoined policyholder’s,
v  the deliberate acts of the strangers and perhaps others, as well. 
In other words, causes of loss in the cyber world are just as combinatorial and therefore as many as in the real world.
 Both insurers and insureds want to know the probability of any risk, though for somewhat different reasons.
A type of risk that is insured will be called a “category of coverage” or some verbiage like that.
Here are some typical insurance agreements in first-party cyber policies (or parts of policies):
§  The network security of the insured is breached.
§  The privacy components of the insured are breached.
§  A regulatory proceeding is inflicted upon the insured.
§  The insurer in subject to an adverse media event, e.g., an insured is defamed.
§  The insured’s digital asserts are destroyed, damaged, or rendered unusable.
§  The business income of the insured is reduced..
§  The insured is subject to an extortion or X-napping.
§  The insureds’ system is subject to negligent care of some sort:
o   Design
o   Construction
o   Maintenance
o   Securitization,    
o   and so forth
The reader will note that many of the covered categories, though not all, turn up on both the first-party cyber policies and the third-party policies,
            Of course, there is a whole variety of definitions.  Some commonly used terms are defined: “Damages,” for example; “Claims” for another.  Many of these terms and phrases are found in real world policies, though the definitions are most often different. Almost every term which is technical sounding and/or connected to something central in the cyber world is defined. The definitions are “stacked,” meaning that for many definitions that explicitly appear on the semantic surface of a policy, in the insuring agreement, for example—there is at least one definition used in it.  And then for many of the second level definition, there is a third, and so on.  Here are common examples of such terms: “Digital Assets” is like this, as is “Electronic Publishing” along with “Network Security,” and many others.
Corresponding Coverage Categories for Some Liability Policies
Here are some coverage categories for cyber liability policies. The insured’s liability rests upon performing “wrongful acts or omissions” (“WAO” [this abbreviation covering both the singular and the plural, as called for]) This whole category rests upon the definition of “wrongful act”; in any case, however, here are some examples: 
Ø  WAO injuring the network of another by dispatching “malicious codes,” and similar “poisons.”
Ø  WAO causing invasion(s) of privacy.
Ø  WAO causing release of private information by another by taking, turning over, distributing, or setting up others to do so.
Ø  WAO involving Internet media use.
Ø  WAO of cyber professionals and/or vendors of cyber-services,
Ø  Performance of any form of hacking, all of which are WAO’s, and/or
Ø  Assisting another (or others) who actually do the hacking.
           


[The reader should please keep in mind that Quinn Blogs are intended to be thought-stimulating [or, thought-provoking] tools only.  The are not intended to be perfected essays.  They are in-progress disquisitions only.  They are not essays polished to completion. Maybe another time.]





Thursday, October 10, 2013

Ironshore Blanket Cyber Policy--Part XI: Insuring Agreement I.J



Michael Sean Quinn, Ph.D, J.D., Etc.
1300 West Lynn #208
Austin, Texas 78703
(o) 512-296-2594
(c) 512-656-0503



TechDefender

Tech E&O, Network Security, Internet Media and MPL Insurance Policy 

Insuring Agreement I.J. TECHNOLOGY AND INTERNET
LIABILITY COVERAGE
Remember: This Blog is organized around insuring agreements, definitions and exclusions. Conditions, etc., may be remarked upon briefly, but they often resemble not only so-called "Real World" policies and those found in other currently existing so-called  "Policies for the Virtual World." It also ignores policy limits, retention matters, notice requirements, time intervals for coverage, etc., important as all these are. As usual, the discussion of everything in this blog is
Be sure to read the "Concluding Remarks," Even if you don't read all--even much--of the rest of the blog.
*****************************************************************************
Insuring Agreement 

Once the temporal and procedural components are ignored, the substance of the insuring agreement looks pretty much like this:

The Insurer will pay on the Insureds behalf all Loss. . .that the Insured is legally obligated to pay as Damages as the direct result of any covered Claim alleging a Technological Wrongful Act
Wrongful Act, except to the extent the Claim "would be covered under Insuring Agreements B and C[.]"  [B is NETWORK SECURITY LIABILITY COVERAGE;  C is PRIVACY LIABILITY COVERAGE, and both have been discussed in earlier blogs regarding this policy.]

It is worth keeping in mind that actionable defects in the rendering of "professional services" are often called "errors and omissions" policies, although both an error and an omission are not required--one of them will do just fine.  They are also often called various types of "malpractice."  (A generation ago, or so, the phrase "errors and omissions" applied to errors of accountants. Those separate usages are gone.)

New Definitions
 
All, or virtually all, of the starting definitions to be found in the insuring agreements (and in the exclusions, for that matter) depend upon other definitions. A rests on B; B rests on C; and so forth. The key definition of a substantively significant matter is the particular type of wrongful act. Going over the definitions will take some time.

The starting definition with which this coverage analysis starts is a buried definition, namely, Technological Services.  Obviously, the nature of (or the character of) a "wrongful act" depends on that activity with respect to which there has been a wrongful act. This definition is complex; it takes up nearly half a page. 

One thing about the idea of Technological Services is that it includes many services that are regarded as "professional services" on some policies in the so-called "real world."  These are policies that are not ordinary policies, e.g., for life, home and similar buildings, individual vehicle (including boats and the like), etc.  They are not ordinary business policies that cover a slew of ordinary activities.  Instead they are policies that cover specialized and "high class" activities, usually by persons and their companies. Only their professional activities are covered, and in many cases the "wrongful act" is negligence. Here are some examples: physicians, lawyers, accountants, psychologists, brokers, some financiers, and so forth. The Technological Services definition covers some professional services, in this sense, but others as well.  (Then again, perhaps in cyber lingo and its system of concepts lots of activities are called professional the analogues of which in the so-called "real world" would not be counted as such.  This may be quite reasonable since it is a very complex "world.")

Here are some of them:
(1) analysis, design, [and much else] of Computer Systems
 (2) "data base design," (including the warehousing, storage, or recording or analysis of data, etc.)  [MSQ: surely including "cloud" activities],"
(3) other related services:
(a)  consulting, etc. of "technological information," plus manufacture, repair, etc., \
(b) licensing computer software,
(c) website design, and the provision of various sorts of services, etc.,
(d) design, etc., of chat rooms, etc.,
(e) "e-commerce transaction services," etc., &
(f) "electronic data destruction services."

The meaning of the phrase Technological Wrongful Act is much simpler;  it "means any or alleged actual act, unintentional error alleged act, omission neglect or breach of duty by an Insured or Service Provider to others for a fee, including the Insured's intentional breach of contract to render services to others, or the failure of the Insured's Technological Products to perform the function intended."

The idea behind Technological Products is easy to grasp.  So is the idea of Service Provider, except that it is a hireling of the Insured and does its work. (Of course both of these summaries of definitions are just that, rough summaries.)

A too limited (and somewhat speculative) summary is this: The kind of wrongful act covered has to do with fouling up work in connection with an insured's technological work (or those of its service provider) they directly harm some computer stuff belonging to someone else and found in the so-called "cyber world" damages to the company to which the cyber material. However, I.J.provide coverage to that portion of this policy "covered under insuring agreements I.B and I.C." [The emphasis is mine] 

The "and" in this exclusion\or limit built into the insuring agreement requires that an event and consequence of that event be covered under both I.B and I.C in order to be outside J-coverage.
The coverage provided in I.B is injuries and then losses inflicted upon the network security of another by means of a covered wrongful act. (See Part See III.)  Being covered by I.B but not I.C doesn't entail no coverage under I.J.  Insuring agreement I.C covers injuries and losses caused to the privacy (or privacies) of others.  (See Part IV)  .C alone does not take an injury and its losses out of I.J.  It must be conjoined to I.B.

My guess is that actionable invasions of privacy on the net can occur without the destruction of or injury to network security.  I.J is really about fouling up the rendition of cyber services.  Obviously,
inflicting damages upon a network is the same as a failure to renter satisfactory services.  Not will the latter likely to invade someone's privacy.  So why separate them off so sharply? Simplifying adjustment? Unlikely: the adjustment process with remain the same.  Premium allocation?  A little more likely, perhaps, since reinsurance would be priced differently without this "exclusion." Neither of these seem likely, however, so I am mystified.






Wednesday, October 2, 2013

An Ironshoe Cyber Insurance Policy--Part VIII: Insuring Agreement I.G




Michael Sean Quinn, Ph.D, J.D., Etc.

1300 West Lynn #208
Austin, Texas 78703 
(o) 512-296-2594
(c) 512-656-0503




TechDefender

Tech E&O, Network Security, Internet Media and MPL Insurance Policy 

Insuring Agreement I.G: DIGITAL ASSET EXPENSES COVERAGE

Remember: This blog is organized around insuring agreements, definitions and exclusions. Conditions, etc., may be remarked upon briefly, but they often resemble not only each other but those found in currently existing policies. It also ignores policy limits, retention matters, notice requirements, time intervals for coverage, etc., important as these are. As usual, the discussion of everything in this blog is tentative, partial, and perhaps mistaken here and there.  It is a new and relatively uncharted ocean.

*  *  *  *  *  *
This insuring agreement is the first of three first-party coverages. It is important to quote the entirety of the agreement, and then give a quick explanation. As usual this agreement depends upon several definitions, two of which are new here; as usual they depend on others. There are more definitions than will be discussed here, since they have been discussed early in these blogs, so they will not be discussed in detail. 

Here is I.G:
"The Insurer will reimburse the Company for any Digital Asset Expenses the Company incurs as the direct result of the corruption, damage, impairment, destruction or deletion of Digital Assets directly caused by a Network Security Incident[.]"  [This is the end of what will be fully quoted in this blog.]

There are several important points to note in this definition. First, the Insurer has an obligation to reimburse.  Technically, under the wording of the contract, this means the Insured has to spend the money before it collects from the insurer. The Insured's right to reimbursement only for covered spending.  Thus, the Insurer probably has a right to "observe,"  "monitor," and maybe even to some degree "regulate"expenditures.  [The words in quotes are mine, not those of the policy.] Of course, any such regulation must be reasonable and necessary.

 The rights of the insurer and the insured parties to the contract may conflict on this and--of course--other matters. One area disputes in this area might develop is over the need for forensic investigation; carriers may sometimes assert that one is enough; while the insured may assert that it has a right to pick its own investigator.

Second, it is the Company and not the Insured that is covered in I.G. Of course, the Company is part of the Insured, but it is not the only one; the others are individuals and they are named as Insureds here.  Probably that is because it is the Company that will be incurring the expenses that are covered.

Third, the term "direct" is in I.G twice. Hence, there must be two direct, as opposed to indirect, causation's.  First, the covered expenses must directly result from a covered incident to which the covered Digital Assets were subjected. Second, the expenses must directly result from the corruption [etc.] of the Digital Assets.  

(The reader might use the following images to get an idea of required directness. Suppose Obama sends a diplomatic message to Putin. He might hand it to him. That's obviously direct. The U.S. Secretary of State might tell him or hand him a note. Is that direct? If Obama "wires" it; and the document is decoded; the Russian Foreign Secretary picks it up, reads it, and hands it along; maybe with a memo; Is this "direct"? Are there degrees of directness?  If so, how does this handle back-and-forth arguments about claims?) See Retail Ventures Inc. v. National Union Fire Insurance of Pittsburgh, PA., 691 F.3d (6th Cir. 2012)

Of course, as already said, there are many other definitions, some of which are complex right on their surfaces and some of them involve other "sub-definitions," and they may be quite complex. Many other cyber policies are like this. The reader has been warned.

Some Key Definitions

The place to begin to sketch the other key portions of this agreement I.G is with the idea of--the definition of--a Digital Asset:

"Digital Assets means Electronic Data, Software, audio files, and image files stored on the Company's Computer System." (And then is a list of what is not within the definition, e.g., some pieces of paper, "unless they have been converted to Electronic Data, and then only in that form.")  The main themes of the definitions within this definition are predictable, although there may be sub-surface subtleties; all such components will be subject to endless dispute.

The other key definition is Digital Asset Expenses:

The phrase Digital Asset Expenses, as one might expect, to what it costs to replace or restore Digital Assets that has been injured in specified ways "corruption or deletion as the direct result of a Network Security Incident. Of course the expenses must be "reasonable and necessary."  These Expenses include "disaster recovery and or computer forensic investigation efforts[.]"  In addition, the replacement or restoration must be done in specified ways, e.g., solid records or other (to some extent) matching Electric Data.

Exclusions


There are no exclusions uniquely applicable to this insuring agreement and its definitions. The definitions more or less are taken from the language of definitions found in policies, designed for the so-called "real world" apply, of course, as to the definitions formulated for all--or many--of the sections