Thursday, January 16, 2014

Cyber World Insurance and "Kidnap Ransom & Extortion" (KRE) Policies



Cyber World Insurance and "Kidnap Ransom & Extortion" (KRE) Policies


Michael Sean Quinn, Ph.D., J.D., c.p.c.u. . . .
The Law Firm of Michael Sean Quinn et
Quinn and Quinn
                                 1300 West Lynn Street, Suite 208
                                             Austin, Texas 78703
                                                 (512) 296-2594
                                            (512) 344-9466 - Fax

                                E-mail:  mquinn@msquinnlaw.com



The Chubb Group of Insurance Companies has put out a KRE policy that covers both the so-called "real world" and the "cyber world." As readers well know, I hold distinction in contempt; there is one world and various dimensions. Of course, there are a variety of ways in which the cyber dimension of the world can present its self, video games being a prominent one.  Of course, video games are that; they are games; and they are videos of the game.  They are not "eyes" into a separate reality. Nevertheless, I will use the phrases "cyber world," "cyber space" and "virtual world" because of their popular use.

In any case, Chubb has classified this policy as part of a system of policies that it has named "FOREFRONT PORTFOLIO 3.0sm." I will focus on the parts of this policy which cyber coverages are important. The use of computers, digital languages, etc. making ransom demands, dealing with them, communicating about them are not topics here.

Nothing will be said about real-world kidnapping coverages.  There will be no reference to the seizure of real children. At the same time, in this policy, there is no explicit distinction built into this coverage when used in the cyber-world or used in the real-world.  In both cases, some "bad guy(s)," as they are now called on television (and therefore elsewhere, as well) have captured a person and are demanding money for his/her return in exchange for something valuable, usually money.  (Of course, there may be peculiar forms of ransom-demands arising out of cyber-world  and real-world interactions. Exchanging networks for people, exchanging networks for networks, exchanging the life of a child for a pledge of no-more-hacking, a demand that bitcoins be used to pay the ransom, and so forth.)

Background 


This the prose and organization of this type of policy is of the same format, organization, and to some extent the vocabulary as those policies that are typically in this category but conceived only for the real world. It is a "claims-made policy" with purchasable extensions, either or both, (1) back in time for including more insured events for which there may coverage causes and (1)coverage continuing forward in time for including more filing claims, repairing damages, accomplishing restoration, etc., but not new covered causing damage.

Claims-made insurance policies come in many forms. The basic idea of them, however, is quite simple. In a claims-made policy the right to coverage is tied  in time to when the covered event causing damage or injury occurred.  That period of time is often one year, but it could be different. Policies that are not claims-made policies do not tie injury-causing events and making claims arising out of them together in time.  A covered event and the injury it causes can be years apart.

The temporal  tie between injurious event, the injury, and the claim(s) can take different forms. Here is an example. Medical malpractice insurance is to be found in claims-made policy.  If Doctor Diogenes, an amputation surgeon, slices off Larry's left arm, when it should be the right, then the covered negligence and the injury occur at the same time.  After that, Diogenes must make a claim to  Isabella Insurance Inc. during the same policy period.

Of course, claims-made policies and fact patterns can become vastly more complex, e.g., when the injury is subtle and is not noticed for longer than the policy period.  But none of that applies here. Extortion policies and person-napping policies involve very quick successions of time.

First-party coverage is about losses sustained by the insured.  A helpful analogy when thinking about first-party policies are policies covering tangible property.  There are other sorts of first-party policies, but this is a simple and easily understandable  starting point. Obviously, the kinds of policies discussed here are first party policies.

Various first party policies have a variety different provision regarding how and when they are obligated to pay covered damages.  A few will pay in advance for work that has to be done.  Others pay on behalf of the insured for such work. Some will receive the invoices from vendors and pay those.  The far more common provisions obligation that the insurer need pay the insurer for covered losses the insured has paid form.  For example, if the insurer's building tipped over, the carrier would be obligated to pay only if the loss was covered; the insured has paid to repair or replace at least some of it; and the payments are reasonable. These are called, naturally enough, "reimbursement policies."  Sometimes the insurer is not obligated to pay any reimbursement costs until the job is through, but it is far more common for the insurer to monitor the work of the vendor, or of the insured itself, a pay a bit at a time.

The Chubb Policy


This point having been made, it is important to note that all of the coverage in the first-party portions of the Chubb policy (with one exception not relevant here) pay only on a reimbursement basis.  This means that the insured must pay his own way down the path of covered situations and then the insurer will pay him for the reasonable expenses it has spent.  Obviously, this is invariably an area of sharp controversy in all sorts of reimbursement policies.


In cyber policies, the definitions are often crucial. This because much of the terminology if "foreign" users of common English.  The central definition in this policy is of the phrase Extortion Threat.  (In this policy, words and phrases defined in the policy are in bold.) It is discussed here only in so far as it applies to cyber states of affairs.  I am leaving out threats made about doing something injurious to solid objects.

There are no insured kidnappings in the cyber world. Executives of  Microsoft might get kidnapped, but that is a real world. Would it be of any interest in the "world" of insurance coverage if a video game got hacked and some character in the game, some avatar named "Schmuck" was "kidnapped"?  For the same reason, it is hard to see how there could be actual, real demands to pay ransom.  For what?  "I've got your avatar, Archangela, and if you don't pay me a bunch of bits, she will disappear into far cyberspace galaxies a long way away, where you will never find her"?

The idea of extortion, however, works in the cyber world, just fine. "Pay a gazillion dollars into a trust fund at Credit Swiss named "Hackers' Delight" and do it tomorrow between 1:00PM and 2:00PM.  The person in charge of the account is Jack Bauer, ask for him by name."

I will be concentrating on some of the substantive parts of this policy, in particular the part that specified what the coverages are, the portion that consists of definitions, and the part setting forth explicit exclusions. There will be little here about conditions, portions of the policy related to conditions, or the declarations pages.

Insuring Agreements

In any case, here are the subtitles of the "Insuring Clauses," often called "Insuring Agreements." The provide a good start for developing an idea of what is covered:

A. Kidnapping, Extortion Threat and Express Kidnapping Coverage.
B. Custody Coverage
C. Expense Coverage
D. Accidental Loss Coverage
E. Legal Liability Costs Coverage
F. Emergency Political Repatriation Expense Coverage
G. Disappearance Investigation Expense Coverage [&]
H. Express Kidnap Cost Coverage Hostage Crisis Costs Coverage
I. Hostage crisis Costs Coverage

Definitions

Cyber policies often have many more definitions that real-word policies do. This one is not very different, except that most of the definitions are easier to understand. In any case, this policy  It has  
approximately 42 definitions, some of which have quite a large number of sub-parts and only approximately 12 of them have components have parts that are important to grasp to understand the cyber components of the coverage.

The key definitions that are noticeably cyber-related are:
"Insured Person," which I will petty much  ignore
"Extortion Threat," which is extremely important when formulated in terms of cyber matters
"Computer System"
"Computer Violation"
"Contaminate" [here applied only to the physical parts of  "Computer Systems"]
"Expenses," in part [This is by far the longest of the definitions, 18 subparts, though not all of them apply to cyber situations.]
"Extortion Threat," [Probably the most central of all the definitions though applicable only to cyber situations involving one or more Insured(s).]
"Independent Contractor," [In the cyber realm.]
"Insured Event," [Applying only, for our purposes, to cyber matters.]
"Merchandise," [Relevant but not discussed here.]
"Propriety Information," [In the cyber realm.]
See immediately below.

Now for a look at what I find the most interesting definitions of all, the one for the Exportation Threat.  The list of covered expenses for extortion threats is mixed together with  other covered states of affairs that result from such a threat.  Most of these are expenses an insured company (an Organization, as the company called it) has to deal with when there has been an Extortion Threat, or kidnapping, etc.:  Of course, those expenses must be reasonable.  In any case here are some of them:

  • security consultant,
  • public relation consultant,
  • cost of relevant advice,
  • temporary security measures,
  • forensic analyst,
  • security consulted who can analyse the Extortion Threat,
  • fees for retraining relevant employees,
  • &c.
I find this exciting because there are few real world policies have this sort of coverage, some D & O policies being exceptions.  I especially enjoy reflecting on all the adjustment problems which would arises out of the spending on the expenses.  Imagine a controversy over whether the fees of the independent security consultant were reasonable.  Imagine having to deal will controversies about all the expenses at once. 

As already stated these definitions, at least in theory, have some limited applicability to cyber situations, but not all of them are relevant to every such situation, or even most of them.  I am being overly cautious, perhaps, when I say this definition probably does not do much work, if any, in the cyber world.  There is little precedent, if any, in this field, and lawyers involved in coverage litigation on these type of issues can be very inventive and subtle.

Perhaps the central definition in the list is Computer System. That phrase means "any computer or network of computers of an Organization including its input, output, processing, storage and communication facilities, and shall include off-line media libraries..."  Obviously, this phrase as defined includes both solid object, such as the one at which I am working from on this blog and the one you may be using to read what I have written, and would at least appear not to be solid object, e.g., data, its "location, its structure, internal directions and so forth."

The phrase Computer Violation  is just as important. It is divided into three sections.  It means "unauthorized"
(A) "entry into or deletion of data in the Computer System;"
(B) "changes of data elements or program logic. . .kept in machine readable format;" or
(C) "introduction of instructions, programmatic or otherwise, which propagate themselves through a Computer System," where any of these are "directly against any Organization."

[The term Organization is not explicitly defined, but it is probably intended to mean objections that are not natural persons that are insured, e.g, a corporation and a subsidiary limited partnership, or an entity not connected to another Organization that is party of a business system involving "artificial" entities but which has some special status. For example, it might belong to an owner of the central Organization.]

The phrase Extortion Threat is also central. Its essence is that of being a threat, and that  means the damaging state of affairs has not yet occurred.  The extortion is a new though related event. Here are at least some of its relevant parts.  Not all of the threats concern cyber situations; here are some that may:

In any case, here are some cyber-relevant parts of the definition:
(C) threaten to disseminate, divulge or utilize Proprietary Information;
(D) threaten to "disseminate or make negative information regarding the [insured's] Merchandise; or
(E) threat [made by various sorts of persons with various intents and purposes] to "adulterate or destroy any Computer System by a Computer Violation. . ." but to seek payment(s) for not following through. 
the definition further provides.

Built into the idea of Extortion Threats is the idea of Proprietary Information.  This is extremely important to cyber coverage is general, since intellectual property is one of the most difficult and financially significant areas for coverage.  Some violation of the privacy rights of customers of Target, for example, may be awkward, irritating, worrisome, and reputation-reductive for a short time, but actual serious financial losses have heretofore proved unlikely, and their probability may be diminishing further as time goes by.  IP is a different matter' both individuals and business fact tremendous financial losses.

Consequently, the terms of the definition are "all important," as popular slang would have it, and here it is: "Proprietary Information means any confidential, private or secret information unique to the [Insured's] business including client lists, drawings, negatives, microfilm, tapes, transparencies, manuscripts, prints, computer discs, or other records of a similar nature which are protected by physical or electronic control or other reasonable efforts to maintain nondisclosure of such information."

[Interestingly, coverage for Proprietary Information is not created by an insuring agreement.  It is through an insuring agreement for Extortion Threats and then Proprietary Information being central to the definition of Extortion Threat.

[There will be controversies coming out of this definition.  Significantly, the term "copyright" does not appear in this definition, and the title of phrase being defined includes the word "information."  Copyrights are not necessarily information.  A new novel or a new poem may be copyrighted, but they may contain no information at all.  The same point applies to other art works as well.  Abstract painting of Jackson Pollock? One by Hopper? A concerto by John Cage? A painting by Balthus?  (Paradoxically, there are exceptions: works of art which are not copyrighted but which contain information.  What did Machiavelli look like?
What about music that contains codes with information in them which can be understood by the few?  Can allegory every count as information?  What about metaphor?  A novel that contains a fictional character but one which "everyone" knows is really a deep literary portrait of Bathsheba Finkelstein {an actual friend of mine from graduate school}, and many people know that this is who being portrayed.

[Another area of likely conflict is whether that which is being insured is something belongs of the insured? Does that insured have an ownership interest in that information?  Must  that insured have an ownership interest in that which contains the information?  A place that might arise is in cyber insurance for law firms.
The Quincy, Quiggley, Quinn Firm has "tons" of information on all sorts devices, and none of it or them belong to the law firm.

[Or suppose the owner of the Proprietary Information has 100 devices upon which some of it is stored, but half of them have no information at all, or material, like abstract art, which may or may not have information. . . . .Notice that the list of definition does not contain one for what counts as information.  Can a proposition that is false count as "information"?  What if the client lists contained one falsehood?  Surely the list would be information.  Now consider the document entitled "Client List" where all but one of the entries is false.  Surely that would not be information.  Obviously, there is such a thing as "alleged information" which is not information. Some might think that this is what litigation is all about.

Thus the idea of Proprietary Information is not like all that is found in the idea of intellectual property.  However, the notion of Propriety Information might be just as good when it comes to trademark and similar matters.]

Obviously, there is much more to say, but at this point the discussion here may be enough for now.

Exclusions

Most of the "Exclusions" are common to kidnap, etc. policies.  They do not fit with cyber extortations, so they will be ignored, for now.

********************************************************************************
p.s. Keep in mind that in the cyber world, the use of this policy is very limited when it comes to Extortion Threats.  I shall return to this topic in another blog.




Tuesday, January 14, 2014

"Look for Coverage"-- A Fundamental Principle of Adjustment





Michael Sean Quinn, Ph.D, J.D., Etc.
2630 Exposition Blvd  #115
Austin, Texas 78703
(o) 512-296-2594
(c) 512-656-0503


I have asserted repeatedly for many years, and when necessary, given arguments for the axiom


Look for Coverage ("the Axiom").  

Various publication on this topic are linked to my WebPage, and it has been included in several CLE lectures.

I have experienced only one insurance adjustment person--a former insurance commissioner who had not been involved in adjustment processes for many years and who never really studied them.  I met him because he was hired for the sole purpose of opposing my views in litigation about coverage.  Of course, I have heard about adjusters who try like the devil to avoid answering questions about the Axiom, but they invariably give in.  Not even the Commissioner provided an argument against the fundamental position of the axiom or any argument for his position.  All he did say was it was "my brain child," and then to infer that it did not hold the axiomatic status that I said it had.  (I'm not sure whether the Commissioner was a licensed adjuster, which I am.)

I now come to the real thesis of this blog:

The Axiom "Look for Coverage" does not so much as suggest the idea "Find Coverage."  Rather it is about pursuing a required reasonable process for a reasonable length of time.  What is reasonable depends in part by the context, though, of course, logic and objectivity must always be employed as must the proper method for empirical research and historical research.

Obviously, the complexity and streaks of doubt about a claim help determine the requirements "rational/reasonable looking" as to both the reasonable pursuit of truth and the amount of time reasonably spent on the project.  Loss of income claims can add a lot to a schedule that involves only property damages, for example.

I think there are four types of "looking": (1) "horizontal," (2)"vertical," for lack of a better term, (4) "intellectual," and (4) "critical" or "claim redo." Horizontal looking is the effort that must be reasonably expended to find out what else counts as a covered loss.  Vertical looking is exploring a given claim more deeply. Intellectual looking is utilizing reasonable efforts to examine the claim and see what is really being claimed. This may require discussing the claim with the insured and its representative.

Critical looking is a type of rigorous critique of the insured's formula for his claim or reasoning in support for his claim.  The purpose of this kind of "looking" is not to help determine whether to deny, although that activity exists as well.  The purpose of critical looking is to help the insured.  It is to make sure the claim makes sense.  If the insured, in effect, claims that the roof leaks but also claims it does not particularly by implication, the claim needs correction.  If the insured is making a claim for the wooden unattached car garage but states the claim in terms of the dwelling, the claim may need to be revised. If an insured makes a claim for the destruction of his dwelling on the basis of arson, but also says he burned down the business building himself by accident, the insured needs help in reformulating his claim.  These are simple examples for illustration purposes; many degrees of complexity  needing reformulation exist.  This is particularly turn  in highly complex business claims, e.g., those with business income coverage.

What if an insurer does not do something that it needs to have been done, but someone else does it.  What should happen?  There are several scenarios; one would be that once the insurer finds out, it can either pay for the work, or it can refuse. Obviously, the first of these is the correct alternative. What if the insurer is not told for a long time about the "doing" of the needed work? If the insurer's adjustment was seriously defective in the first place, that is, worse than a simple error, there may be some degree of bad faith. And so forth.

(Each type of looking may be required by the law that all parties to any contract owe the other party some sort of good faith built into the idea of a contract. This idea is not peculiar to insurance. Still an insurer failing to do something really important and then not doing it and/or not hiring someone to do what needs to be done, can be insurer bad faith, whether from the common law or from one or more statutes.)

Friday, January 3, 2014

CLE FOLLIES




Michael Sean Quinn, Ph.D, J.D., Etc., Author
Quinn and Quinn
1300 West Lynn #208
Austin, Texas 78703
(o) 512-296-2594
(c) 512-656-0503


PREFACE

A virtually identical version of this blog essay is to be found on another blog site entitled Quinn's Commentaries on Lawyers and Lawyering, to be found now in the January 3, 2014 essay.  It is reprinted here, because the set of errors arose in the context of an insurance CLE, and it begins with a somewhat lengthy, but rough if not crude, discussion of the Tilley case that may be more understandable here than there.  Since the blog "next door" is the last in a three (3) part series on CLE mistakes, a word or two will be stated here at the end of the blog regarding a general category of error.  In the "tri-series" on the other Commentaries blog, they are to be found at the end of Part I. 


BACKGROUND

Several years ago, I was asked to give a noon-day luncheon talk at a CLE on Insurance Law.  I was flattered, so I took the assignment.  The talk was to be called "Tilley's Follies." Tilley is short hand terminology among Texas insurance lawyers and insurance defense lawyers and some others, from time to time,  for a famous case from the Texas Supreme Court that revolutionized the normative standards and general practices of  insurance defense lawyers.  They had always provide legal representing  to "accused" insureds, their clients, as they still do. After all, that's why they are called "defense counsel." Before the case to be discussed, theses lawyers defending an insured might also represent the insurer when there were doubts as to whether there was coverage. Of course, the liability carriers at issue here were under under a contract with their insureds to defend them.  Obviously, this triangular relationship--insurer, insured, lawyer for both--created a conflict of interest for the lawyers.  The lawyer is helping his client, the insured, and he is working against him in favor of the insurance company. After all lawyers have a duty to advocate for their clients.

This had to stop, and in "steps" the case of Employers Casualty Company v. Tilley, 496 S.W.2d 552 (Tex 1973).  It held three propositions, two of them by implication. First, lawyers may not represent both the insurer and the insured, the latter of whom (or which) the lawyer is defending without the informed consent of the insured.  Second, it is contrary to established propositions of the law of legal ethics to do this sort of thing. And, third, liability insurers may not continence the "tri-partite" relationship having this structure. Several cases have complicated the decision, nothing really of which to speak.

Here is where my problem began. For one thing, insurance defense lawyers have a duty to their clients, the "accused insureds" to discuss the case with the insurer so that the insurer can make rational decisions regarding the defense of the insured.  (Of course, it must subordinate its interests to those of the insureds, or treat them equally at least.)  For another, the defense lawyer may not lie to the insurer for obvious reasons. (For one thing it is legally unethical, second it contravenes the insured's contractual duty to cooperate, and the lawyer is the agent of the client--the insured, and for a third reason, it would stand in the way of the lawyer's believe-ability and that might hurt the insured's chances of getting a reasonable decision from the insurer. At the same time the defense lawyer need not and cannot disclose everything to the insured, e.g., that which is privileged, and the lawyer may advocate his client's interests to the insured's carrier and his--the lawyer's--employer.

Not that it matters here, but virtually all states have a law like this one.  Sometimes the law is weakened with the consent of the insured.  One way this can happen is if the insurer has two adjusters involved, namely one for the defense of the insured and another for coverage matters, and these adjusters are blocked off from one another. No informed insured should consent to this.

GENERAL PREPARATION

As the reader can plainly "see," Tilley is not filled with folly. It has been very successful in the reorganization of insurance defense; what it has achieved is justice; the rule is accepted; and it has thereby improved the bar in all sorts of ways.  (For example, it has riveted attention on conflicts of interest.)

So how could I give a luncheon lecture on this non-existence subject?  The case is very serious; the reading of it is boring;  while reading it one does not have the feeling of a system being overthrown; it is not a waste of time; it is not nutty; and it not jolly.

I asked the "Program Director" what to do. I asked what her intent was. I asked if she could give me some thoughts. Even a hint would be helpful. She said simply that I have a sense of humor and cold be entertaining so not to worry about it. I concluded that she had no idea what was meant here. I asked a couple of others on the Planning Committee, but each of them said he could not remember any discussion or even the decision.  I wondered if they might not be lying.

So I was to be entertaining. The only way I can do something in a context like this one is semantic, to look at alternative meanings.  And here is where the substantive trouble really began.  I could think of nothing more that to look for sources that contained different meanings.  And so I set off.

PARTICULAR PERFORMANCE

Critique of  the Case Itself.My first whack was to describe the case, emphasize the ways in which the consent of the insured-and-client might be procured, argue that the need for the insured's consent could be circumvented by including a needed agreement in the contract of insurance, invoke the rule ALL INSUREDS MUST READ THEIR INSURANCE POLICIES, and go on from there. The folly would then have been not to go under, over, and around the opinion and put in its grave. In addition, I would go further and say that Tilley involved a double folly. I would argue that not only was  Tilley itself a folly--I remember saying: "felonious"--but  that if lawyers with real ingenuity had had the guts to deal with it straight-on it would be dead as a door nail soon enough. Thus, I suggested that the Bar's omission to proceed was itself a folly.  I was very proud of this idea, since folly is not usually, as a semantic matter,  thought to include omissions.

I thought this one was clever, but it flopped.  I next turned to a fun analogy. I tried the idea that Tilley was a kind of fun, a dance at a country club, maybe, or an afternoon sitting on a veranda sipping mint juleps, when I should be at the office trying to devise ways to  talk my client into consenting to my representing the insurer as well as it.

The Seward Analogy.  In 1867 William Henry Seward, the then Secretary of State arranged the purchase of Alaska from Russia for $7m, or so.  At the time the sale was consummated, at 4:00 or so,  he had permission from nobody relevant.  The sale was confirmed almost immediately.  After some time--not terribly great, news papers began calling it "Seward's Folly."

This would have made a good and interesting analogy for Tilley in several ways, with some components of the insurance defense bar playing the role of the newspaper.  This is such a good story, I should have spent nearly the whole lecture on it.  To this day, I think the audience would have loved the game, and the story of Seward himself who had been governor of New York state,  who had lost the Republican nomination for president to Lincoln, served as his Secretary of State, was the most important member of the cabinet, and went on to serve other presidents. See Walter Strahr, SEWARD: LINCOLN'S INDISPENSABLE MAN (2012).


I should have stopped right there.  Too bad, I did not.(A January 2016 Supplement: The Weenend WSJ for 1/23-24/2-15 carried a review of two books about the St. Francis Dam in 1928. This very damaging even may have been partially or principally caused by William Mulholand, one of the principal engineers that and politicians of sorts who created the L.A. (And yes, the "Drive" is named after him.). In any case, the review of the two book is entitled "Mulholand's Folly." It looks like this is analogous to the way the term is applied to Alaska, though the results were at best much more ambiguous. If I had anticipated this I certainly would have stopped at the end of the Seward discuss.)


Analogies to Fun.I then suggested that Tilley's folly as essentially connected to  fun.  Hi-Ho the wine and booze they  flows, so let's join in the fun; if we do, no more folly. I tried Violetta' famous words in the first act of Verdi's La Traviata.  "Everything in life is folly, except for pleasure."  Well, I said, this would make the standard view of studying follies of Tilley, since there is no pleasure at all in reading.  Its prose is C- as really good court opinions go, especially when the quality of the writings of the majority opinion is combined with the even less captivating prose in the dissent.

I had no attraction to this suggestion, however, because, although the study of the case itself is sleep pro-ducing. Thinking about the profundity and elegance of the ideas and their systematic intellectual power was exhilarating. No folly in that. Alas, the audience found this idea absurd, assuming they were not mixing together their potato chips with their tomato soup. (At that noon time anti-festival I came to hate such addresses. I acknowledge that my reaction lacked objectivity, and perhaps even truth. (I wouldn't know.   Shame, if nothing else, has kept me away.))

So I tried using it. I even had a video for the screen cut up with English subtitles the scene in Act I. I saw immediately that this had been a bad idea, if for no other reason that contemporary culture regards many follies as containing fun, fun, fun and therefore pleasure.

More About the Fun Analogy.I had anticipated this, so I looked for variations on "It's Fun" thesis. At least, I said to myself, it would be fun in its self. I was supposed to be entertaining, said I.

  • I thought about using a passage from Erasmus's satire, IN PRAISE OF FOLLY  (1511) "Now there's an amusing and famous. Besides, its about the mistakes of lawyers, "The audience will love it." And then I realized that it was not about insurance defense lawyers and insurance companies; its about the legal profession in general. So I wondered about, rejected that idea, and then used it any way.  .
  • Then I thought about using photographs of famous "Fun 'Places'"  I tried the Ziegfeld Follies: first the building and then the show itself.  The first was too introductory, suggestive of concealment by boring, and the building itself was not architecturally interesting in the slightest.  The show itself might be thought of as anti-feminist. Tilley, of course, was neither. Again, I reflected on whether to use the idea and the exhibits, but was worried about running out of time and so I used the idea anyway.  (One can see why catastrophe was looming.) I'm glad that I did not know enough about Stephen Sondheim's FOLLIES. While it may capture some important fun parts of Ziegfeld atmospherics and perhaps that legal culture that lead up to Tilley, it would have other distracting themes.  





  • I played with the idea of the Follies Bergère, and did the same thing.  The building was more interesting but the inside was hardly any better that the New York venue as to the erotic and the image of women. Still, I thought that Manet's painting of the inside made things  much better. The mirror was used to see the crowd and the woman, the bartender, looked sad.  Therefore, she could not symbolize anybody or thing involved in the case.





The Wig Analogy. Next I turned to a couple of related exhibits that picture a woman putting on a wig.  Except for the contemporary oddity of the photos, and the fact they are concealing something old with something perhaps attractive but recognizable as false, the wig scene was not really helpful, though it might be new-ish.  Still it was so quick to pass by, there would be no harm, and it would wake people up.  O thought rhyming words, like "fig," almost rhyming words like "wiggle," and about unrelated words like "Whig," but nothing even so much as suggested anything. (The "Whig Union Insurance Company?)  I pondered ideas in this sector to my wits end.


               


At last, I gave up on fun as how to explicate the idea of folly.  I got ever more up set with the assignment I had received.  For many years, I have simply declined to follow directions, but at this point in my life, I had come to the conclusion that this attitude isn't always such a good idea.  I didn't know what to do, though I had faith that something could be done.

As Faith of Some Sort. So I tried that is not only procedure but substance.  I tried to think of Tilley as being a folly of faith, or that it was the destruction of an irrational faith--"It was folly [or folly-fus]--in the old order.  If I could do this I would turn that into the idea that the importance of Tilley was a matter of faith. The first of these ideas made no sense to me, and I had no evidence for the second. Consequently, I didn't use the idea at all.  Faith in the old was obviously defective yet people had faith in it anyway.  Even after Tilley was decided many lawyers held to the old organization of the defense lawyer + insured + insurer market. The new version had a whole new approach, the right one, and so after getting used to it, faith in its future would arise in a vast majority of lawyers. (And it has.) However, the idea of progressive versus unchangeable faith sounded too religious. I was in a secular context, after all. This sort of thing--CLE's in general--were required by a state entity, namely the Supreme Court of Texas.  This was the weakest idea yet. Even more weak that the wig episode. So again I changed course.

Book Titles. Then I began using semantically analogous language coming from different contests. I started with a book entitled WATER FOLLIES published in 2002. The title is attractive, I said to myself, but the book itself is really about how groundwater pumping destroyed the Santa Cruz River in Arizona and is sending the rest of the country into the hand basket which will take us all to hell. I immediately stopped; people were walking out. I junked this approach on the spot.  (There are lots of examples of titles like this, but I ran through the slides in 20 seconds.)


Recently I saw a fascinating book by Evgeny Morozov entitled TO SAVE EVERYTHING[,] CLICK HERE.  The subtitle of the book is "The Folly of Technological Solutionism."  It was published in 2013. The thesis of the book, roughly speaking, is that nothing, not even the Internet, and its relatives, can cure us all of everything, and they might even do damage while we tried to make it so.  I would have used the idea as a critique of the idea that Tilley, or any other case really, can solve complex legal problems.  Of course, I'm glad I did not experience the temptation.  No doubt it would have washed me away. I never seem to learn.  See below.


The Architectural Analogy. At last I reached my third most  favorite idea: the so-called "Folly School" of architecture of the 18th Century. Here are several examples.  Their essence was to be complex, beautiful, and unfinished. Surely legal history is like that, I thought, including Tilley, perhaps above all, or--at least--most.  (If nothing else, I reassured myself, the CLE is about insurance and that includes property insurance.)









Tilley was like these I said to myself, except for the last one which comes across as wrecked as well as deliberately unfinished.  (Again, the topic or property insurance and its vicissitudes danced before my imagination.)  My opinions and its supporting arguments were complex; the whole jurisprudence was beautiful; the ideas of the case would be elaborated for centuries; and that's how long the new approach would last. Alas, nobody lit up at the idea when it was presented. And it was obvious that nobody bought it. I was disappointed, to say the least, especially since in the first exhibit the structure appeared to be ready to fall into the sea and the last one looked like wreckage and not just intentionally incomplete.

The Poirot Analogy. This is an Agatha Christie source, coming from a novel entitled DEAD MAN'S FOLLY published in the U.S. in 1956. It has been popular for longer than a half century;  it has been serialized in a then popular magazines (US Collier's Weekly, UK John Bull with illustrations),  translated into at least 18 languages, adapted as a film, put on the radio, run in several TV shows, including PBS's "Masterpiece Theater in 2014, and  even a video game is named after it.  The term in the title refers to an instance of a the kind of folly now being discussed, and it plays minor roles right up to the end, when it plays a central role being the. . . . . . . . . 

The presentation was within 3 minutes of being over, so I presented by second favorite idea. A church pictured upside down.  I suggested that this is how the insurer-insured relationship could be pictured once Tilley was decided.  Again no reaction.  I see now that the idea could not be made to work.

Upsidedown-ness Analogy.  Here is an amusing and stimulating analogy, I said, as I went forward. Still, I had doubts.  Isn't there an offensive attitude toward Christianity built into this image?  I took the chance.  Again no affect--not even some "Wow--over the sculpture work.") This took 0.5".



The Analogy of the Light House. I thought about showing the scene from Folly Beach in South Carolina, but rejected the idea because of the light house and its possible interpretation as to symbolism.  ("The dock was no problem, but the light house just would not work. Convey the wrong idea entirely," I said to myself.) In this context, the abstract relationship between the light house and property insurance was not even tempting. Took 0.2" time, since problem just flashed through my mine and I  passed the slides  by.




At last, I abandoned my efforts and showed one last slide. My time was about out already anyway. I had 1.5".

It pictured a winding road moving up a mountain. I suggested that this picture portrayed the idea of the historical picture of the law: up a little,  aside a little and even downward either by slippage or misguided intent. (Notice that the pictured two-lane road can be driven in two directions, and it is possible to go off the road entirely and crash down several hundred feet.  When there is a crash like that you can't get straight back up to the road.  You must avoid snakes, you may have to start over trudging along, or you may have to go-go with the flow of the stream or struggle along against it no really knowing where the river goes.)  I ended by asserting that Tilley was and is at a crucial point and was moving up.



Guess how the assembled but mostly sleepy group, that early afternoon, reacted to this ending.

So, what all might this flop tell us about CLE lecture preparation?

First, don't try do wild stuff, even if you find it interesting, stimulating, and communicable.  Others won't.  Don't deviate far from the central purpose of CLEs.  That purpose is to inform those in attendance, assuming they are actually interested in the main topic, about what relevant law has been produced in the last couple of years. This is true luncheon discourse as well as serious talk.

Second, serious lectures should follow a formula.  The most important matters are the recent.  Supreme Court cases from the last couple of years.  Significant changes in statutes or administrative rules. Court of appeals cases.  The last category is the usually the most important.

Third, speakers should avoid an almost compelling urge, namely to try and develop a slew of subtle ways the cases are distinct and really contrary to each other.  Such speakers make it sound like there are real possibilities for using them to prevail when such courts conflict.  In fact, speaker-noted or created subtle distinctions are likely to fail 8 times out of 11.  It may make the speaker feel intellectually superior and in general a bigger deal in the law than those in the audience, but those trajectories of self-idoltry are to be avoided and denounced.

Fourth, Program Planners  might consider using the noonday talk to do legal ethics.  I have seen this done with digital devises and it seems to work.

Fifth, pictures and cartoons are to be limited, except during a cartoon based lecture and nothing else.  No pictures Balthus painted (1908-2001) should be used, ever!

P.S.: Here is another temptation and another possible error.  It just occurred to me this weekend, January 4, 2014.  In the lighthouse-dock group on a beach named "Folly Beach," I entirely neglected to treat the sea and a character for creating the analogy or the symbolism for the image.  If the sea became the entirety of the relevant law, the light house would become the Tilley Principles for protecting the dockit--the very complex dock--could be made to be the symbol for both the insureds and the insurance defense lawyers.  If I were to have tried this, it would have had to come immediately after the Steward Analogy and the only thing left would probably the highway/mountain analogy.  So the talk would \have three images. Wait! Have I learned nothing?! See above.

P.S.#2: "Works of Art as Folly." Nor am I the only Errer (i.e., one who commits errors or errs). On July 25, 2014, the House Natural Resources Committee issued a 58 pp. report calling the project for creating a memorial sculpture of Gen. Dwight Eisenhower and other soldiers, designed by a world famous designer Frank Gehry and his firm, to be placed on the Washington Mall a "Five Star Folly."  NYT, C1 for Monday, August 4th and a picture at C4.  It's suitably dignified, very  handsome and may be great.  Granted it's way over budget, but the costs of works this large, complex, and large, are always a lot and government budgets for this sort of thing are almost invariably deliberately under priced at first, so that someone else can  take the blame for the gross costs.   Granted also, the critique may be a kind of political Ziegfield-folly, or easily called that, given that it is a mid-term election year.

P.S.#3. A month ago, or so, early 2015, I discovered that Stephen Sondheim created a "Broadway Musical"--music and lyrics, anyway--entitled "Follies." Some think it among his best.  It concerns characters like those in the "Ziegfeld World." I guess I haven't quite learned my lesson, because I find myself wishing to have known about it and included in the presentation. (Of course, it could not have been known then, there would be talk of its being made into a movie because of the success of Into the Woods.

P.S.#4. Several days ago, mid-July 2015, I ran across a phrase I had not imagined: "sublime folly." This phrase is used in the great 19th Century French novel, The Charterhouse of Parma by Stendhal.  It is among the thoughts of a young, naive, handsome young Italian noble man as he contemplates making love to or with a forbidden woman. Obviously, lawyer work does not involve "sublime folly," at least not in this sense.  Then again, there is sublimity in imagining, formulating, and even giving an elegant, profound argument, even if the lawyer knows that it is not likely to win a case.  (At the same time, all competent lawyers know that one may not given even the most sublime arguments if they make losing a case more likely.)


Thursday, January 2, 2014

CYBER INSURANCE SUPPOSED: "Real World Insurance"



THE "REAL WORLD" v. THE "CYBER WORLD"


Michael Sean Quinn, Ph.D, J.D., Etc.
1300 West Lynn #208
Austin, Texas 78703
(o) 512-296-2594
(c) 512-656-0503
www.michaelseanquinn.com


I have been warning readers for some time, that insures of the so-called "REAL WORLD" would begin excluding losses from the So-Called "Cyber World."  (I have also said a number of times that there are no standardized cyber insurance policies. The latter is a slight exaggeration on my part.)

Here is an example of a new cyber exclusion; it is found in an endorsement; and it is entitled "Cyber Risk Exclusion." It comes from a form marked "USFire 000015" and marked FM 600.0 191 08 05.  The origin of the first of these two, but the second is less self-explained. The initials have over many years meant "Factory Mutual," but there is not reason to think that is true here.

Substance

In any case, the endorsement says it applies to a number of named policies.  The list is restricted to cyber risks to the extent that they are found in the following parts of commerce policies: Boiler and Machinery Insurance*, plus the following parts** of other commercial policies: Crime, Inland Marine, Property. (*First "Footnote": Boiler and Machinery policies are not explicitly named as a type of commercial policy, but they all are, as they have always been.)  (**Another "Footnote": The meaning of the word "part" is not clear.  If a policy is completely devoted to one risk, say crime, so it is a "Crime Policy" and nothing else, does the cyber loss exclusion being discussed here apply to such policies? But there must be a cyber exclusion for that situation, although it might be a section in the policy itself and not in an endorsement.  There would be no confusion if the exclusion applied to all the insuring agreements, and anything else that might be relevant.)

There is one exclusion with three sub-parts. The key to the exclusion is this: "The Company will not pay for Damage or Consequential loss directly or indirectly caused by, consisting of, or arising from [any of the following three:" [Emphasis added.]
1. "Any functioning or malfunctioning of the internet or similar facility [i.e.,  any other net],
2. "Any corruption, destruction, distortion, erasure or other loss or damage to data, software, or any kind of programming or instruction set.
3. "Loss of use or functionality[,] whether partial or entire[,] of data, coding, program, software, any computer system or any device dependent upon any microchip or embedded logic, and any ensuing liability or failure of the insured to conduct business." [Emphasis added.]

There is another exclusion which does not identify itself as such, be that is what it is.  [Here it is in abbreviated part.]: All Damage [as defined in the policy] or Consequential [as defined in the policy] loss are "excluded, regardless of any other cause that contributes concurrently or in any other sequence." [Emphasis added.]

At the same time, reads the endorsement, the usual perils to be found in physical injury to first party property policies--or most of them, anyway--are not excluded.  [I say first party property policies, but maybe not for at least a couple of areas.]

As with all endorsements of this type--exclusionary endorsements--this one states that it does expand coverage in any way.  The meaning(s) of all other "terms, conditions and exclusions of the policy are unchanged."  In other words, none of them is altered in meaning.

Comment

More than one comment are quite possible, but only one shall be set out here. The disjunction of "direct or indirect" is very obscure. (a) Does the word "direct" mean that the cause is a significant part of a group of direct causes? (b) Might the word "direct" exclude coverage if one of the causes  is anywhere in a causal change, except the last link in the causal chain? (c) Or does the idea of direct require that the excluded cause be the only--the one and only--cause of the Damage?

Alternative (a) is reasonable, the other two are not.  Consider the following descriptions. (i) Quinn is playing pool.  He uses the all white q-ball to strike the 4-ball.  Is this direct?  It surely is within the game of pool, but it is part of a causal chain: Quinn looking, Quinn studying; Quinn deciding; Quinn striking the cue ball.  Now consider Quinn striking the 4-ball by first striking the 2-ball. Granted the second set of facts is less direct than hitting it first.  Within the game of pool this sequence seems direct, as does striking one or more sides, when contrasted with outside acts, for example, throwing the cue ball at the 4-ball, using either end of a tennis racket or throwing it at a wall, the ceiling, or another player, and then hitting the 4-ball.  In other words, being direct varies with the context.

In addition, complex events are virtually never caused by simple events. Thus, if "direct" means "only," there are no direct causes. In addition, if Damage is caused both by the corruption of data and the distortion of software at the same time then the exclusion would not be triggered, since it--that combination-- is not separately in the list of exclusions it is not excluded.  Correct thought this view as a matter of semantics and logic, one wonders if pragmatic and practice orient courts will buy it.  So much for the literal interpretation of contracts. 

When a lawyer is thinking about coverage in "direct result of" contexts, or similar wordings, s/he should be thinking of different ways to describe context, actions, omissions, and events.